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INTRODUCTION 
The past three years in Northern Ireland have been marked by particu-
larly "dramatic" events. In November 1987, a father touched the hearts of 
millions when he told the world of his last moments with his daughter amidst the 
rubble of a Provisional IRA "mistake". In March 1988, the SAS shot dead a 
Provisional IRA Active Service Unit in Gibraltar. As a result, three more 
funerals were thrust into an already tense atmosphere of policing Provisional 
IRA funerals. In the end the RUC's politically courageous decision not to police 
these funerals was totally negated by the actions of a Protestant "Rambo". At 
the funeral of one of his victims some of the most sickening scenes yet filmed 
in Northern Ireland showed the very public murder of two British soldiers. In 
August 1988, eight young soldiers were blown to pieces by the Provisionals near 
Omagh. There were the inevitable eyewitness accounts of mutilated bodies, 
desperate cries of anguish and of young men crawling away to die alone. 1989 
and 1990 were notable for a number of Provisional shootings and bombings, in 
Northern Ireland and in Europe, in which civilians were killed or maimed "by 
mistake". Some were victims of mistaken identity; others were simply in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. 
Following the 1988 incidents, politicians in all parts of Ireland and 
Britain demanded action, and the British government announced a major 
security review. As a result of this review, both legislative and judicial changes 
were introduced and the finances of terrorist organisations came in forparticular 
attention. The most controversial new measure, however, was the British 
government's media ban, which seeks to deny direct access to electronic media 
by proscribed organisations. 
The Provisional IRA, too, was forced to react to these events. In January 
of 1989, in an unprecedented move, it announced that it had disbanded the 
Active Service Unit which it said had been responsible for most of the mistakes 
of 1988, and the Enniskillen bombing of 1987. At Sinn Fein's annual conven-
tion held a couple of weeks after this announcement, President Gerry Adams 
made a statement openly criticising the Provisional IRA, and the Provisional 
IRA responded with a statement accepting the criticism and promising not to kill 
any more civilians. These events and the downturn in Sinn Fein's vote put the 
Provisional IRA on the propaganda defensive.1 
This is certainly not the first time the Provisionals have been on the 
defensive. The reason why they have always been able to recover, and even 
assume the offensive, is because of their careful and considered construction of 
legitimacy. This essay will examine the Provisional IRA's construction of 
legitimacy from two angles. First, it will analyse the legitimacy the Provisional 
IRA constructs around its cause. As one would expect, the most common 
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propaganda themes are Ireland's historic and inalienable right to national self-
determination and Irish nationalism (or rather the Provisionals' interpretation of 
it). And second, it will consider the legitimacy the Provisional IRA constructs 
around its use of violence. Two related propaganda themes are most prominent 
here: the historical continuity of "physical force republicanism"; and attacks on 
the methods the British government has adopted in response to the Provisional 
IRA. It is admitted that these themes are mutually reinforcing, not mutually 
exclusive. The reason that they are differentiated in this paper is because in 
terms of "de-constructing" the Provisional IRA's legitimacy, primary respon-
sibility as regards the former area lies with the Republic of Ireland, whereas in 
the second area it lies with Britain. 
LEGITIMACY AND "THE CAUSE" 
In constructing legitimacy around its cause, the Provisional IRA takes as 
its fundamental premise that all Ireland has a natural and inalienable right to 
national self-determination. The only thing preventing Ireland from claiming 
this right is the British presence, which is invariably described as "colonial", 
"neo-colonial" and"imperialist". To supplement this theme, and indeed to make 
its version of national self-determination meaningful, the Provisional IRA also 
has to promote an Irish national image distinct from the British and increasingly 
from the European. 
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
What the Provisionals claim they are fighting for is Irish national self-
determination, based on the argument that Ireland is "historically, culturally and 
geographically one unit."2 Conveniently enough, the Provisionals' version of 
history begins in the twelfth century when English forces first tried to conquer 
Ireland. The Irish continued to resist until 1921, when finally a measure of 
freedom was achieved. But, as this historical argument goes, the December 
1918 election had produced a mandate for an all Ireland republic which the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty failed to deliver. Thus the Irish Free State was illegal, and a 
continuation of the struggle was necessary to obtain national self-determination. 
The Provisionals have always been aware of and readily exploited Britain's 
colonial past.3 But the presence of British soldiers on the streets of Northern 
Ireland is only the most obvious manifestation of Britain's colonial or neo-
colonial policy. As circumstances in Ireland and the rest of the world have 
changed, so has the Provisionals' explanations of Britain's presence in Northern 
Ireland. In the 1980s, Provisional propaganda increasingly emphasised the 
strategic interests of Britain and its NATO and EEC allies as the rationale for 
Britain wanting to maintain its presence there. A 1984 article in An Phoblacht, 
the Provisional Sinn Fein newspaper, asserted that 
The British presence, which once made sense in classic imperi-
alist/capitalist terms, can now only be explained in terms of 
strategic interest, of NATO and can properly be defined as 
political imperialism.4 
But as stated above, Britain's military presence is only the most manifest aspect 
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of its imperialist designs. 
While NATO's strategic doctrine may remain remote to the Catholic 
community of Northern Ireland, the socio-economic deprivation it suffers is not. 
Presenting this socio-economic deprivation as another aspect of Britain's 
colonial policy has undoubted propaganda advantages for the Provisional IRA. 
It enables the Provisionals to argue that Northern Ireland is "administered 
directly in the British interest" through the maintenance of "structural discrimi-
nation."5 According to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, British neo-colonial 
policies have also had their impact on the Republic of Ireland which, while being 
administered by Dublin, is done so in the interests of Britain.6 The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, argues Adams, is the latest example of Britain modernising its 
colonial arrangements: 
In the final analysis the agreement is about stabilising British 
interests.... It is an attempt to isolate and draw popular support 
away from the republican struggle while putting a diplomatic 
veneer on British rule, injecting a credibility into establishment 
'nationalism' so that British rule and the interests it represents 
can be stabilised in the long term, and insulating the British from 
international criticism of their involvement in Irish affairs.7 
The British presence today then, is presented as part of an historic continuum of 
colonialism. But the Provisionals also represent a continuum of fighting against 
Britain's colonialism and for national self-determination. 
According to the Provisionals, the men and woman of all generations in 
Ireland who have fought against British rule have provided our "glorious 
heritage" and to "follow in their footsteps is at once an obligation, a privilege, 
and an inspiration."8 Historical appeals appear regularly in the pages of An 
PhoblachtlRepublican News, and the analogy with the present situation is 
emphasised; 
There is little doubt that recent IRA operations ... evoked 
memories of Tom Barry's IRA freedom fighters driving the 
British out of the twenty one counties and people can be confi-
dent that today's IRA will push the British out of the rest of 
Ireland.9 
The history of Ireland, argue the Provisionals, shows that diere will be no peace 
until the British leave, and that increased repression or even execution cannot 
deter the Provisional IRA. The original IRA and its true descendants (the 
Provisional IRA) 
did not disappear after 1916 when they executed die leaders and 
interned thousands and nor did it in 1981 when they executed ten 
republicans on a hunger strike in Long Kesh after years at the 
hands of a barbarous brutal prison system which had inflicted 
repression and torture at will.10 
The implication of this line of analogy, of course, is that die Provisional IRA is 
part of an historical process, fighting for a right that is denied solely by the 
British presence in Ireland. ' ' As will be discussed below, die legitimacy mat die 
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Provisional IRA constructs around this historical analysis stems largely from the 
Irish Republic. Much the same can be said about its interpretation of Irish 
nationalism and what constitutes an Irish identity. 
Irish Nationalism 
It was Patrick Pearse who decreed that Ireland should be Gaelic as well 
as free,12 and in doing so not only denied a diversity of culture, but also limited 
Irish nationality to the Gael. Pearse, like the Provisionals, claimed inspiration 
from the Young Ireland group, especially Thomas Davis, and the Gaelic League. 
Both these groups were essentially cultural organisations stressing language, 
literature, folk stories and sport. Of the Gaelic League in particular Pearse 
claimed to have "said it again and again that when the Gaelic League was 
founded in 1893, the Irish revolution began."13 
The Young Ireland group had helped to stage a rebellion in 1848, which 
was a dismal failure. But, it was important for its impact on the development of 
Irish nationalism. Its justification for the rebellion was based on the historical 
right of the Irish nation to exist. It was not based on a "foreign" philosophy, as 
was Wolfe Tone's advocacy of the Rights of Man. Rather.it provided an 
indigenous intellectual framework for nationalists who were fighting for an 
Ireland not merely free but Gaelic as well, and for the elimination of English 
language and cultural as well as political dominance in Ireland. But Pearse took 
the centrality of Gaelicness and language much further than either Hyde or 
Davis; 
Irish nationality is an ancient and spiritual tradition, and the Irish 
nation could not die as long as that tradition lived in the heart of 
one faithful man or woman. But had the last repository of the 
Gaelic tradition, the last unconquered Gael, died, the Irish nation 
was no more. Any free state that might therefore be erected in 
Ireland, whatever it might call itself, would certainly not be the 
historic Irish nation.14 
Thus Pearse equates Gaelicness with Irishness. It is this rather narrow, and 
somewhat polarising, interpretation of Irish identity that is pushed by the 
Provisionals in their argument that "[t]he extent to which we become free in fact 
and secure our freedom will be the extent to which we become Gaels again."15 
Perhaps the best example of the Provisionals' attitude to a pluralist 
Ireland is the abandonment of their federal plan for a future united Ireland which 
would have devolved considerable powers to Ulster. But now federalism, 
according to Gerry Adams, is only a sop to Unionists which must not be 
tolerated.16 The loyalist people of Northem Ireland are simply "neo-fascist, 
anti-nationalist and anti-democratic."17 The possibility of any Unionist resist-
ance is dismissed as "hypothetical."18 Once the British withdraw from Ireland, 
Unionist consent to the Gaelic republic will somehow be a natural consequence. 
Actually, this is one of the few areas of inconsistency in Provisional IRA 
propaganda. In order to maintain their image as defender of the Northern Ireland 
Catholics, the Provisionals frequently invoke the threat of a Protestant "back-
lash". 
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The frequent references in Provisional IRA propaganda to Ireland's 
historic battle for self-determination are coupled with appeals for a lost 'iden-
tity' and a lost language. The Irish language is heavily promoted in the pages 
of An PhoblachtlRepublican News, and Sinn Fein claim to be striving for a 
situation where "the Irish language will become the everyday language of the 
people."19 At the 1983 ArdFheis, the Provisionals' national convention, Gerry 
Adams told the delegates '"Better broken Irish than clever English. ' If you have 
Irish, no matter how little or how poor, use it."20 Other aspects of Irish culture 
stressed within the pages of An PhoblachtlRepublican News include the ac-
tivities of the Gaelic Athletic Association, and traditional folk and dance 
evenings. Stressing a distinct culture alongside historic appeals is important for 
the Provisionals. The aim is to encourage people north and south of the border 
to see themselves as culturally distinct from the English, and to prevent the Irish 
from becoming totally submerged in American "pop culture". But it is an 
interpretation of Irish nationalism which puts the English conquest in direct 
opposition to Irish civilisation; the Anglo-Saxon against the Gael. 
The legitimacy surrounding the Provisional IRA's cause, an independ-
ent thirty-two county Gaelic republic, is constructed around themes of national 
self-determination and a particular interpretation of Irish nationalism. This 
cause, in turn, provides some of the material with which the Provisionals 
construct legitimacy surrounding their violence. 
LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE 
As was suggested above, there are two predominant propaganda themes 
related to the construction of legitimacy surrounding the use of violence; the 
historic theme of physical force republicanism, and elements of British policy 
in Northern Ireland. But it is important to remember that these are also presented 
within the overall framework of Ireland's historic and inalienable right to self-
determination, as defined by the Provisionals. 
Physical Force Republicanism 
The origins of "physical force republicanism" lie with the Fenians, 
whose whole philosophy was based on the assumption mat English rule in 
Ireland was based on force and could only be ended by force. Patrick Pearse 
adopted the Fenian idea that a small group, perhaps just seven men, could lead 
Ireland to independence. He believed that the majority of Irishmen had sold their 
Irishness to the Home Rule concept, and needed to be mobilized by those 
qualified to defend the national honour.21 Pearse defined the national honour in 
terms of an independent and Gaelic state, and said, "I do not know how 
nationhood is achieved except by armed men, I do not know how nationhood is 
guarded except by armed men."22 Pearse's glorification of violence and blood-
shed is not unique, especially when considered in historical context, but what 
Pearse had done was to establish the four premises on which physical force 
republicanism is currently based: firstly, that the use of force is legitimate; 
secondly, that the Republic is not a thing to be negotiated for, thirdly, accepting 
anything less than a Republic is a betrayal of national honour; and finally, that 
a small elite group can both define and defend the national honour. 
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In presenting themselves as the direct heirs of this physical force 
republicanism, the Provisionals stress two things: the necessity of physical 
force; and a rejection of any sort of compromise or constitutional approach. Not 
surprisingly, this sort of propaganda overflows with historical reference points 
and comparisons particularly regarding the 1916-22 era. Catholics are encour-
aged to see themselves as oppressed slaves who should fight their way out of 
slavery, just as Patrick Pearse recommended; 
I should like to see any and everybody of Irish citizens armed. 
We must accustom ourselves to the sight of arms, to the use of 
arms. We must make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the 
wrong people, but bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying 
thing, and the nation that regards it as the final horror has lost its 
manhood. THERE ARE MANY THINGS MORE HORRIBLE 
THAN BLOODSHED, AND SLAVERY IS ONE OF THEM.23 
However, while the English presence in Ireland may be wrong, and 
while there may be no real peace in Ireland while it remains, the Provisionals still 
need to convince their audience that their strategy of violence is the correct one. 
This is done in three closely related themes: first, that violence is morally right; 
second, that violence is defensive; and finally, that violence is necessary 
because no other method will bring the desired results. 
The Provisionals believe that the justness of their cause, gives them the 
moral right to engage in violent actions. Duringthe 1983 ArdFheis, Gerry Adams 
declared that the armed struggle is a "morally and correct form of resistance in 
the six counties."24 Within this armed struggle the Provisionals enthusiastically 
present themselves as defenders of the Catholic community. To compound this 
defensive image, all other groups are dismissed as totally inadequate. The 
Provisionals can then hold themselves in readiness for the "Protestant back-
lash".25 
This inability of any other group to defend the Catholic community is 
extended into an argument mat no other group can claim to speak for or represent 
the Catholic community. The rejection of any sort of constitutional road to a 
united Ireland is based also on historical grounds. According to Gerry Adams, 
[t]here are those who tell us that the British will not be moved by 
armed struggle. As has been said before, the history of Ireland 
and of British colonial involvement throughout the world tells us 
that they will not be moved by anything else.26 
The argument is that each time republicans put their faith in constitutional 
politics they were outmanoeuvred and blatantly disregarded by the British. 
History had proved that the 'stepping stone' theory of Collins had failed. Now 
there is no room for compromise because 
each time we compromised in our struggle for independence, we 
succeeded in doing nothing but bringing destruction and death 
on our country, and handing onto a new generation an unfinished 
struggle for freedom, which the young men and woman, in their 
rum, had to pay for in rivers of blood.27 
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Thus any demands for peace are "reactionary rubbish," as they in no way 
advance the "freedom struggle."28 The last legitimate government of Ireland 
recognised by the Provisionals is the 'Second Dail' which met in 1921, and on 
this basis they remind people that "Stormont, Westminster and the Dail Eireann 
have no right to direct the destiny of the Irish people."29 Nor have the members 
of any of the political groupings within these institutions any right to speak on 
behalf of the Irish people. 
Two other groups excluded from any representative role by the 
Provisionals are the Official IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA). Both these groups use or have used violence, and claim legitimacy from 
much the same historical sources as the Provisionals. But theirs is a legitimacy 
dismissed as false by the Provisionals, with the implication being that only the 
Provisionals can define and defend the national honour. The "legitimacy" battle 
between the Provisionals and the Officials spilled over into a physical battle in 
October 1975. The Provisionals accused the Officials of betraying fundamental 
republican principles and of being too left-wing.30 The INLA, like the 
Provisionals, emerged from a split in the Official IRA, and perhaps for this 
reason the Provisionals initially provided them with some support.31 But by 
1986, the Provisionals were calling for the INLA to disband, saying it comprised 
"a group of people who, for personal financial benefit are masquerading as 
republicans."32 
The Provisionals do attempt to construct an image of legitimacy based 
on the claim that they are the direct heirs of the physical force tradition. Inherent 
in this tradition are claims that the use of force is morally and politically 
legitimate, that the Republic cannot be negotiated for, advocating or accepting 
anything less is a betrayal of republican principles, and that only the Provisionals 
can define and defend die national honour. 
British Policy 
The claims that only violence can achieve die desired republic are 
supplemented with further themes attacking the British presence in Northern 
Ireland. The British military presence is singled out for special condemnation, 
as are all other instruments of law enforcement. Provisional IRA violence is 
presented as a defensive reaction against the oppressive British state. This then 
opens the way for attacks on the credibility of the security forces, and a process 
which Maurice Tugwell calls "guilt transfer,"33 whereby the blame for all the 
deaths, injuries and destruction caused by the Provisional IRA is placed firmly 
on the British regime. The treatment Catholics, and particularly Provisional 
IRA prisoners, receive within the justice system is another favourite target of 
Provisional IRA propaganda. 
Accusations of offensive action by the security forces have been a 
prominent part of Provisional IRA propaganda since 'Bloody Sunday' in 1972. 
The Royal Ulster Constabulary, Ulster Defence Regiment, and the British Army 
(in particular, the Special Air Service) are all accused of adopting shoot-to-kill 
policies, an accusation given some credence by the Stalker debacle, which will 
be discussed below. Even when Provisional IRA volunteers are killed on the 
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point of committing a clearly intentional lethal action, the Provisional IRA 
claims its members are shot deliberately when they could have been arrested. 
One such incident occurred in Loughall in 1987. After this incident the 
Provisional IRA released a statement which claimed that "[v]olunteers who shot 
their way out of the ambush and escaped saw other Volunteers being shot on the 
ground after being captured."34 However, while enjoying a significant place in 
Provisional IRA propaganda, the number of direct confrontations with the 
security forces resulting in the death of a Provisional IRA member remains 
relatively small. The vast majority of active volunteers caught are taken into 
custody. 
Provisional IRA allegations of torture and brutality while in custody 
began in earnest after the introduction of internment in August 1971. It is 
certainly possible with the benefit of hindsight to criticise the British for 
countenancing the introduction of internment, not least because it provided the 
Provisional IRA with an effective recruiting campaign, somewhat sarcastically 
acknowledged by the Provisionals themselves; 
The Republican movement in Belfast extends to her Majesty's 
forces their heartfelt thanks for the magnificent recruiting drive 
that they have held on our behalf.35 
Nor is it possible to praise the British for the physical implementation of 
internment. It was clumsy; the use of out-dated intelligence resulted in the 
interning of many who had little or no connection with the Provisionals; and 
leaks permitted the escape of some who did. The clumsiness of the internment 
operation, and the techniques used by the British on some of those detained, led 
the Irish government to enter a petition against Britain in the European 
Commission on Human Rights. Similarly, allegations of security force misbe-
haviour prompted Amnesty International to undertake several investigations in 
Northern Ireland. These allegations certainly embarrassed the British, and 
whatever the degree of truth contained in them, they were undoubtedly encour-
aged and manipulated by the Provisionals. Particularly after the introduction of 
internment, Sinn Fein urged people to go to bodies such as The Association for 
Legal Justice and voice allegations of brutality.36 In an attempt to brutalise the 
image of the Army, posters were displayed in the Republic of Ireland and 
mainland Britain showing baton wielding and gas-masked soldiers.37 
Strongly linked to attacks on the credibility of the British state is the 
process of guilt transfer. Blaming the British for all the violence in Northern 
Ireland is common in all areas of Provisional IRA propaganda, and related to 
colonial and oppressive themes. Less than a month after the Provisionals had 
shocked the world with their detonation of a bomb at the Conservative Party's 
annual conference in Brighton, Adams described this action as "an inevitable 
result of the British occupation of the six counties."38 Danny Morrison reacted 
to the same event by saying "[t]he moral position is irrelevant. What the British 
government and the British people have to realise is that what they are doing 
leads to this type of action."39 Similarly Owen Carron, on his election as a 
Westminster MP, when asked to condemn violence said, 
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the major part of violence is created and maintained by Britain. 
All other violence is a counter to the state violence of the security 
forces. The real terrorists are the UDR and the Police.40 
As well as demonstrating the process of guilt transfer, this statement presents 
Provisional IRA violence as reactive to the actions of the security forces. But 
the Provisionals also attack the British administration of justice, particularly the 
legislation and penal system under which the security forces operate. 
The two pieces of legislation most constantly attacked by the Provisionals 
are the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act and the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act. Both Acts do contain sweeping powers 
and the Provisionals argument is that they are applied indiscriminately, and are 
used simply for the purposes of harassment and intelligence-gathering. For 
example, Adams claims that in 1973, the security forces searched "75,000, one 
fifth of the number of houses in the whole of the 6 counties; almost every house 
searched was in a nationalist area."41 
But the treatment of Provisional IRA members actually in custody is, 
perhaps, the singularly most consistent theme in Provisional IRA propaganda. 
Allegations of maltreatment and improper conditions appear frequently in the 
pages of An PhoblachtlRepublican News, as do letters smuggled out of the jails 
complaining of brutality and thefts by prison staff. One of the most common 
complaints is of the authorities' refusal to grant compassionate parole, which is 
another "callous weapon" of oppression.42 "The tortuous indignity of strip-
searches"43 is also an aspect of the prison regime presented in highly emotional 
terms. 
Prisoners and hunger strikes are nothing new to the Republican move-
ment, with names such as O'Donovan Rossa and Terence MacSwiney a 
prominent part of Republican culture. At the centre of propaganda surrounding 
Provisional IRA members in prison is the claim that they are "political" 
prisoners. To a large extent the British initially concurred with this, and 
accorded Provisional IRA prisoners "special status". But this was removed in 
1976, and its reinstatement has been a major goal of the Provisional IRA ever 
since. 
In October 1980, Provisional IRA prisoners in the H-Blocks announced 
their intention to go on hunger strike. They demanded 
as of right, political recognition and that we be accorded the 
status of political prisoners. We claim this right as captured 
combatants in the continuing struggle for national liberation and 
self-determination. We refute most strongly the term 'criminal' 
with which the British have attempted to label us and our 
struggle.44 
This particular hunger strike ended in December without death. In March 1981 
however, Bobby Sands began a hunger strike that was ultimately to end in ten 
deaths. Before Sands died, he was elected to the British parliament as the 
member for Fermanagh/South Tyrone. Sands' election, and the themes sur-
rounding his campaign, is surely an indication that, while the Provisionals' 
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methods may be condemned, there is a fairly wide acceptance in the Catholic 
communities of Ireland mat their motivations are political. If this is so, then it 
is not surprising that the Provisional IRA is able to construct legitimacy around 
issues of the administration of justice. This is certainly one of the biggest 
challenges facing British counter-insurgency strategy. But it is important to 
remember that this article is concerned with a much wider counter-Provisional 
IRA strategy, and in this the Republic of Ireland has as big a role to play as 
Britain's. 
LEGITIMACY AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC 
After the Brighton bomb of October 1984, the then Irish Prime Minister, 
Garret FitzGerald condemned the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein in no uncertain 
terms. But contained in his condemnation is one very significant phrase, which 
if it provides the basis for explaining the Provisional IRA's construction of 
legitimacy, may also provide me basis for 'de-constructing' it; 
There is however one particular shade of our feeling today which 
is unique to those of the Irish nationalist tradition. I mean our 
deep anger at the arrogance of the Provisional IRA in doing these 
things in the name of our tradition, in the name of our aspiration, 
in the name of our legitimacy.45 
So then, what is the Republic's tradition, aspiration and legitimacy? 
The New Irish Free State, established by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, 
took much of its ideology from Pearse, including his interpretation of what the 
Irish nation should be. Once the civil war (during which Northern Ireland and 
partition were not issues) was settled, the Free State concentrated on asserting 
its independence. In accordance with the ideas of Pearse, independence 
involved asserting Catholicism and Gaelicism. In the 1920s and 30s, a series of 
laws was passed enshrining the Catholic moral code. In 1925, divorce was 
prohibited; this prohibition still requires a constitutional referendum to change 
it. In the 1930s, dance halls were required to apply for licences and the 
importation and sale of contraceptives was forbidden. In 1937, the secular 
constitution of 1920 was dropped, in favour of acknowledging the special 
position of the Catholic church. The Catholic church was given control over 
education, and in 1923, Gaelic was made compulsory in all primary and 
secondary schools.46 Change has been extremely slow, and as a result "our 
tradition" remains defined primarily in terms of a Gaelic and Catholic Ireland. 
In 1984, the Dublin government organised a forum to discuss features of 
the overall Irish situation, and invited all interested parties to contribute. The 
resultant New Ireland Forum Report was an attempt to define the problems of 
Ireland and the two major cultural identities within it. However, it was far from 
being a critical review of the origins and attitudes of the Republic itself, and as 
a result 'old' rather than 'new' Ireland attitudes predominate. Like the Provi-
sional IRA, the chapter dealing with the historical origins of the problem puts 
the blame solely on the British. The British establishment of Normern Ireland, 
the report declares "was contrary to the desire of the great majority of the Irish 
33 
Summer 1990 
people for political unity and sovereignty of Ireland as expressed in the last all-
Ireland election of 1918."47 And because of the British failure to 
accept the democratically expressed wishes of the Irish people 
and because of the denial of the right of nationalists in the North 
to political expression of the Irish identity and to effective 
participation in the institutions of government, the 1920 arrange-
ments did not succeed.48 
Similarly, the report says that the hope generated among nationalists by the 
Sunningdale agreement of 1973 was destroyed because the British "failed to 
sustain" it.49 
Thus, the Forum report offers the same historical analysis as the 
Provisionals, which puts Britain at the heart of the problem; because Britain 
failed to consider the wishes of the Irish people as a whole, the report argues, 
Northern Ireland is and always will be a failed political entity. There are many 
things the report fails to consider,50 but among the most obvious are a recogni-
tion that the Irish state and Provisional IRA have the same heroes and martyrs, 
and that the Free State was established by a forerunner of the "ballot box and 
armalite" strategy. They also share the same national aspiration, as defined in 
Articles II and in of the Republic's constitution. 
Although the degree of commitment to a united Ireland among both 
northern and southern nationalists can be questioned,51 the aspiration is un-
doubtedly strong. The rhetoric too, is frequently forthright and unambiguous. 
For example, in 1969 the then Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, took to the 
national air waves to declare, 
... the reunification of the national territory can provide the only 
permanent solution for the problem, it is our intention to request 
the British government to enter into early negotiations with the 
Irish government to review the present constitutional position of 
the six counties of Northern Ireland.52 
A decade and a half later, the Forum Report had dropped unity as the only 
solution, but maintained it as the political structure that the Forum "would wish 
to see established."53 "Our aspiration" then, also remains fundamentally un-
changed. 
The Forum Report proposes a set of ten realities which it claims are 
"necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge."54 
The third of these states, 
[agreement means that the political arrangements for a new and 
sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed 
to by people of the North and by people of the South.55 
The central ambiguity of this is: when would these negotiations take place -
before or after a British withdrawal? Haughey, in explaining his interpretation 
of "agreement", seems to confirm the Unionist interpretation that negotiations 
would take place only after a British withdrawal; 
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Agreement and consent means that the political arrangements in 
Ireland to be established following the cessation of British 
military political presence will have to be negotiated... .56 
This raises the question of Unionist resistance to any sort of united Ireland. And 
again, particularly Fianna Fail's answer bears close resemblance to the Provi-
sional IRA's. In 1971, Neil Blaney dismissed the Unionist backlash theory in 
the following terms, 
... there has been no backlash, and there will be no backlash now, 
because the people have come to realise that they are our people 
and we are their people... They realise that the six county setup 
cannot last much longer, and that is why there has been no 
backlash.57 
Over ten years later, and despite a massive showing of Unionist strength in 
bringing down the Sunningdale agreement, Fianna Fail still dismisses lightly the 
threat of Unionist resistance; "They've never actually been pushed into a 
situation of having to carry out their threats."58 This coincides with die Provi-
sional IRA's argument mat the question of Unionist resistance is merely 
"hypothetical." 
The New Ireland Forum Report is fairly indicative of the monolithic 
interpretation of Catholic/nationalist history which presents Britain as the 
source of the problem and claims the whole island should be administered as one 
unit. And this as the Unionists rightly point out means 
with both the state and church supporting the same objective of 
unity as the Provisional IRA, that the great mass of Roman 
Catholics in Ireland find the legitimacy of the IRA can be 
couched in terms which they find difficult to reject.59 
Thus,"Our legitimacy", that is, the Republic's, remains the same. 
LEGITIMACY AND BRITAIN 
It is the British government's responses to the Provisional IRA, both 
physical and non-physical, that have allowed the Provisional IRA most latitude 
in attacking the credibility of the British state. It must be said however, that the 
British are far from blameless, and have on occasion inexplicably set themselves 
up. One of the earliest, and in many respects the most damning, examples of this 
was the Compton Commission's conclusion that torture implied that the 
inflictor derived pleasure from his actions, and that therefore the security forces 
were not guilty of torturing detainees interned in 1971. The Compton Report60 
was widely criticised throughout Britain, Ireland and the United States. The 
Irish government immediately announced that it would request that the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights investigate the torture allegations. In 
September 1976, the Commission found against Britain and the case proceeded 
to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Eventually in 1978 (on appeal) the European Court ruled that the five 
interrogation techniques in question did not constitute torture, but ill-treatment. 
Whether the five techniques did constitute torture as opposed to ill-treatment is 
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essentially a definitional problem, as not all ill-treatment is torture. But it is 
difficult not to agree with Lord Gardiner that the techniques were "illegal alike 
by the law of England and the law of Northern Ireland."61 And in using these 
techniques, whatever the justification, the British government gave the Provi-
sional IRA a successful and credible propaganda line. 
Despite British undertakings to abandon the techniques and consider-
able sums of compensation, the allegations of torture did not cease, although the 
focus of the allegations did shift to the RUC and the Castlereagh Holding centre 
in Belfast. In June 1978, after a series of media disclosures, an Amnesty 
International Mission concluded, 
[o]n the basis of information available to it, Amnesty International 
believes that maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the RUC 
has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the estab-
lishment of a public inquiry to investigate it.62 
The British government did respond with the Bennett Report into interrogation 
techniques and procedures. Bennett's recommendations, including the video 
taping of interviews, were implemented, and the number of complaints against 
the RUC fell dramatically.63 Nonetheless, the indefensible behaviour of a 
section of the RUC and the British government's initial failure to counter it, gave 
the Provisionals more valuable and credible propaganda, and led to writers such 
as Kelley and Curtis giving the impression that all Provisional IRA suspects 
were callously tortured by all members of the RUC.64 
The RUC was again at the centre of an embarrassing episode for the 
British government involving the Deputy Chief Constable of Manchester, John 
Stalker. Stalker had been sent to Northern Ireland to investigate a number of 
fatal shootings by the RUC in late 1982. But before Stalker could finish the 
inquiry he was removed and suspended from duty on the flimsiest of evidence. 
Although it was denied by the government that his removal had anything to do 
with Northern Ireland, it was generally believed that Stalker was about to 
uncover evidence of a RUC shoot-to-kill policy. Stalker, in his own account of 
these events, seems reluctant to use such terminology, but clearly suggests that 
an informant led the RUC to target several of those shot, in revenge for a land 
mine explosion which had killed three policemen in November, 1982.65 
Stalker's report was completed by Colin Sampson, Deputy Chief Con-
stable of West Yorkshire, but in February, 1988, the Attorney General decided 
that no charges would be brought against any member of the RUC. Nonetheless, 
Stalker, in his book levels some very serious charges against the RUC and 
alleges some serious weaknesses in RUC operating procedure.66 Many of the 
issues raised by Stalker are extremely complex and largely outside the scope of 
this article. What is not, however, is the blundering and clumsy manner in which 
these events were handled by the British. The Stalker episode is another object 
lesson in transferring legitimacy to Provisional IRA's cause. It is by ruthlessly 
exploiting British security force blunders in Northern Ireland, rather than 
through its own actions, that the Provisional IRA has been able to construct most 
legitimacy surrounding its violence. As noted earlier, much the same can be said 
about the administration of justice. 
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Two particular examples stand out: the "supergrass system" and the 
classification of Provisional IRA prisoners. Questions most often raised about 
the use of supergrasses involve the use of questionable and uncorroborated 
evidence (mainly the confessions and subsequent allegations of the super-
grasses), the number of people involved in the trials, and the length of time spent 
on remand while awaiting trial.67 The spectacle of over thirty people in the dock, 
with the supergrass as often as not retracting his evidence,68 certainly gave 
credibility to Provisional IRA accusations of 'Sham' and 'Show' trials. These 
trials did nothing to re-establish confidence in the British system of justice, 
already severely dented on both sides of the border. And coinciding as they did 
with the accusations of a RUC shoot-to-kill policy, the Provisional IRA was 
able, once again, to construct legitimacy for its use of violence. 
Since 1976, Provisional IRA members have been classified as ordinary 
criminals, and the British government claims it deals with them as criminals. 
This is clearly not the case, and claiming that it is only puts the British 
government in an unnecessarily difficult counter-propaganda position. For 
example, the British government's claim that Provisional IRA members are 
ordinary criminals alongside its use of the SAS against them, not only lacks 
credibility, but also has had the effect of, at times, making it appear ridiculous. 
SAS units operating against the Provisional IRA give credibility to its accusa-
tions of an oppressive state, and convey the impression that the government is 
not in control of the situation, especially when statements are issued that 
subsequently have to be revised. 
The British state's treatment of imprisoned Provisional IRA members is 
another area where the Provisional IRA has been able to construct legitimacy. 
This must raise questions as to the credibility of the British state's attempts to 
classify convicted Provisional IRA members as criminals. Bobby Sands' 
election to Westminster, Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew's election to the 
Dail and several empirical studies69 point to the conclusion that this is not a 
perception shared by wide sections of the Irish community. Thus attempts to 
criminalise Provisional IRA members are always going to have to be at variance 
with credible propaganda claiming that they are political prisoners. 
CONCLUSIONS: DE-CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY 
This article has argued that Provisional IRA propaganda constructs 
legitimacy around two broad themes; its cause and its violence. It also suggested 
that the Republic of Ireland continues to provide much of the legitimacy 
surrounding the cause, whereas Britain provides much of that surrounding the 
violence. The major conclusion to be drawn from this is that defeating the 
Provisional IRA will require a concerted effort from both the Republic of Ireland 
and Britain. Northern Ireland is not simply Britain's problem. Neither is 
Northern Ireland Britain's simply to give away. 
An unequivocal recognition by the Republic that one million people do 
not wish to belong to the Catholic and Gaelic state that the Republic has defined 
itself to be, would seem to leave the Republic with two alternatives. It can decide 
that the Catholic and Gaelic state is more important than national unity, or it can 
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decide that unity is more important than the Catholic and Gaelic state. Either 
way, the Republic would move away from the convenient but unsustainable 
argument that only Britain stands in the way of the Catholic, Gaelic and unified 
state. Such a move would also do much to de-construct the legitimacy the 
Provisional IRA has been able to construct around the themes of national self-
determination and Irish nationalism. 
For Britain the crucial problem remains how to respond best to the 
Provisional IRA on a day to day basis. At a general level, it must be accepted 
that the use of force, including lethal force, is sometimes necessary against the 
Provisional IRA. Republican and liberal arguments that it is not are as pointless 
as denying that any of the Provisionals' grievances are legitimate. But what 
prevails in Northern Ireland is a situation where the circumstances in which the 
security forces can employ lethal force is still virtually a state secret, twenty 
years after such force was first used.70 Having such circumstances widely 
publicised could produce a number of advantages. It would allow the British 
government to take a more offensive propaganda approach, rather than always 
having to defend the actions of its security forces. It would also mean that the 
Provisional IRA would not only have knowledge of the risks entailed in its 
behaviour, but also, in a legal sense, it would have to consent to these risks 
(volenti non fit injuria). 
Dismantling the 'prison culture' is undoubtedly one of the most difficult 
tasks facing the British government because it involves a recognition that 
"criminalisation" has not worked. But such a recognition would release Britain 
from an incredible counter propaganda position, and would do much to de-
construct the legitimacy the Provisional IRA constructs around the themes of 
defensive and necessary violence and colonial and oppressive themes. 
Looking back over twenty years of violence, it seems that a combination 
of the Republic's clinging to a false analysis of Northern Ireland and Britain's 
inability to stop the violence has created a void skilfully exploited by the 
Provisional IRA. Admittedly, de-constructing the legitimacy of the Provisional 
IRA's propaganda will be no easy task. But it is argued that without some 
attempt to do so, security offensives will remain a necessary but not sufficient 
response to the Provisional IRA. 
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